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Social cognition research has frequently been crilici/ed ns being asocial 
in nature. Although the information processing paradigm, to which 
social cognition research is committed (Ostrnin, I9M), stimulated an 
enormous research proclnclivity in social psychology, its conccnI ration 
on individuals as isolated information processors fostered a neglect 
of the social context in which human judgment occurs. As I ’orgas 
(1981) observed, "social psychology found ilself transformed into n 
field now mainly concerned not with human social action, hut with 
human beings as thinkers and information processors about social 
Stimuli" (p. 3). In the present article, we argue that even the study 
of "human beings as thinkers and information processors" is likely 
lo suffer from this neglect, and we suggest that social cognition research 
mav greatly benefit from a fuller consideration of the social amlext 
of human judgment. Using (.¡rice’s (1975) maxims of conversation as 
a starting point, we will illustrate our argument with an analysis of 
I he conversational dynamics underlying one of the now classic studies 
on human judgmental biases (Kahneman it Tversky, 1973).
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THE COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE
As a large body of psycholinguists research documents (see Clark, 
1485; I liggins, 1981; Sperber b  Wilson, 1986; for reviews), social dis­
course proceeds according lo a "cooperative" (Grice, 1975) or "relevance" 
(Sperber it Wilson, 19Bf>) principle. This principle holds llial speakers 
should "try to be informative, truthful, relevant, and clear" and that 
listeners interpret the speakers' utterances "on (he assumption that 
they are trying to live up lo these ideals" (Clark & Clark, 1977, p. 
122). This principle can be expressed in the form of four maxims. 
There is a maxim of quality that enjoins speakers not lo say anything 
they believe to be false or lack adequate evidence for and a maxim of 
relation that enjoins speakers to make their contribution relevant lo 
the aims of the ongoing conversation. In addition, a maxim of quantity 
requires speakers to make Iheir contribution as informative as is required 
bul nut more informative than is required, and a maxim of manner
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holds tlml Ihe contribution should be1 clear rather than obscure, am­
biguous, or wordy. Accordingly, "communicated information comes 
with a guarantee of relevance" (Sperber &  Wilson, 1986, p. vi), and 
the listener is entitled lo assume lhal Ihe speaker tries lo be informative, 
truthful, relevant, and clear.1
These basic assumptions, which underlie social discourse in 
everyday selling«!, are routinely violated in studies on judgmental 
biases. In these studies, experimenters as social communicators oflen 
introduce information that is neither informative nor relevant. I lowever, 
subjects have no reason lo doubt the relevance of information provided 
to them in a serious research setting and are likely to assume that the 
utterance reflects a particular "communicative intention'' (Grice, 1975) 
on Ihe pari of the experimenter. To recognize the experimenter's 
informative intention, subjects go beyond Ihe literal meaning of the 
sentence and are "likely to seek relevance in any experimental message" 
(Kalmeman &  Tversky, 1982, p. 502). As a consequence, they are 
likely to Ireat irrelevant information as relevant, resulting in judgmental 
errors relative lo normative models lhal consider only the literal meaning 
of Ihe utterance but not the implications of Ihe communicational context. 
Note, however, (lint these errors nre due to violations of conversational 
norms on part of Ihe experimenter and may be unlikely lo be obtained 
under circumstances that conform lo conversational norms.
To this exlenl, these errors may not generalize lo everyday-life 
contexts outside the social reality of the psychological laboratory. As 
(■'under (1987) pointed out, an "error" (i.e., a judgment of a laboratory 
stimulus that deviates from a normative model) does not necessarily 
represent a "mistake" (i.e., an incorrect judgment in the real world). 
"Delection of an error implies (he existence of a mistake only when 
the process that produces the error also produces incorrect judgments 
in real life" (p. 76).
In the present article, two studies will be reported that address 
one central aspecl of social discourse in experimental situations, namely, 
ihe perceived communicative intention. The impact of this variable 
will be investigated in the context of a well-known research paradigm 
lhat was designed by Kalmeman and Tversky (1973) to study biases 
in human judgment. In such situations, subjects need to understand 
nol only the semantic meaning of Ihe information presented lo them 
but also how this information should be used for the required judgment.
1. Although Sperber & Wilson's (1986) account of Ihe logic of conversation owes much 
to (irii'i*. Ihi'y suRfiesl lhal his foor maxim* should be rcduccd to a single m.iiim of 
rrli’v.iriiT 1W oor present purposes, it is sufficient to note that any utterance lhal 
satisfies Grice’s maxims would be considered "relevant" by Sperber and Wilson.
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Thus, judges have to infer the intended use of a particular piece of 
information. The role of conversational norms for such inferences nnd 
(In* resulting judgments will he discussed on the basis of llw  findings 
from (lie present studies. These findings will indicate that n consid­
eration of the communicativc context of human judgment allows a 
better understanding of some classical demonstrations of a presumably 
pervasive "judgmental error,”  namely, the overreliance on individuating 
information.
INFERRING THE COMMUNICATIVE INTENTION
In a well-known study on the use of the representativeness heuristic, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that subjects relied heavily on 
individuating information of little diagnostic value at the expense of 
more diagnostic base-rate information. For e xa m p le ,  subjects in some 
conditions were told that the target person " s h o w s  no interest in 
political and social issues and spends most of his free lime on his 
many hobbies, which Inclndc home carpentry, sailing, anil mathematical 
pii7.7.les." These subjects predicted (hat the target person is most likely 
an engineer, independently of whether the base-rate probability for 
any target's being an engineer was .30 or .70. An analysis of the 
instructions used in this study proves informative. Specifically, the 
instructions read (emphases ours):
A panel of jisyWio/njfisfif have mtrrviaped and administered ¡wnomlity tests 
lo 30 (resp., 70) engineers and 70 (rcsp, 30) lawyers, all successful in 
llieir respective fields. On the basis of this information, thumbnail de­
scriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been written. You 
will find on your forms five descriptions, chosen at random from the 
IlH) available descriptions. Tor each description, please indicate your 
probability that the person described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 
to 100.
The same task has been performed by a panel of ex/vrls who were 
highly accurate in assigning probabilities to the various descriptions. You 
will be paid a bonus to the extent that your estimates come close lo 
those of the expert panel,
The first part of the instructions informs subjects that the indi­
viduating information was compiled by psychologists on Ihe basis of 
respected procedures of their profession, namely interviews and losls. 
Given that laypersons assume psychologists to be experts on issues 
of personality (rather than base rates), this introduction emphasizes 
the relevance of the individuating information. Moreover, other 
experts— most likely psychologists as well, given Ihe present con-
LOGIC OF CONVERSATION 71
lex!— are said to be highly accurate in making these judgments, thus 
further increasing the relevance of the individuating information. The 
subjects' task is then defined as determining a probability that matches 
the judgments of the experts. If these experts are assumed to be 
psychologists, subjects can infer that (he experimenter wants them 
to use the same information that these experts used, which is most 
likely the personality information compiled by their colleagues.
Finally, as the experiment proceeds, subjects are asked  to judge 
several target persons for whom different individuating information 
is presented. The base-rate information about the sa m p le  from which 
the targets are drawn, on the other hand, is held constant. This further 
suggests that the individuating information is of crucial importance 
because this information provides different clues for each judgment, 
and in the absence of this information all tasks would have the same 
solution. We will later return to this issue in more detail (Experiment 
2).
In summary, the instructions and procedures of the study allow 
subjects to infer (however incorrectly) the experimenter's intention 
that they should base their judgment on the individuating information. 
It therefore comes as little surprise that subjects relied on it when 
making (heir judgment.
UNDERMINING PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNICATIVE 
INTENTION
The above analysis suggests that subjects' reliance on individuating 
personality information should be greatly attenuated when the ex­
perimenter's intention to communicate the relevance of this information 
cannot be inferred from the social context of the experimental situation, 
that is, when the usual rules of social discourse are suspended. A 
similar effect should be obtained if the task is framed so lhat the 
source of the individuating information, and the experts who provide 
accurate predictions, are not experts on individuating information 
(like psychologists) but experts on base-rate information (like statis­
ticians).
To test these hypotheses, a modified replication of Kahneman 
and Tversky's (1973) s tud y was conducted. As in the original study, 
subjects estimated the probability lhat a target person randomly drawn 
from a sample was either an engineer (base rate 30%) or a lawyer 
(base rate 7U%). Following a 2 x 2 factorial design, the task was cither 
presented in a psychology framework (replicating Kahneman and 
Tversky's instructions) or in a statistics framework. In the Inller, the
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nonspecific term "researcher" was substituted for "psychologist" in 
the instructions given above, and "statisticians" were said to he the 
experts who can solve the task accurately. Based on the assumption 
abouI subjects' knowledge that statistical inferences are based on 
distributional but not on single-case inform.ilion, it was expected that 
subjects would infer (hat the experimenter wants them to base their 
judgment to a lesser degree on the individuating information than 
under tlie original context. As a result, smaller deviations from the 
base rates would be obtained when the problem is framed as a statistical 
rather than a psychological task. In a related vein, Zukier and Pepilone 
(1984) demonstrated in another variation on Kahneman and Tversky's 
(1973) study that subjects relied more on individuating information 
when the task was framed as one pertaining to "clinical judgments," 
and subjects were explicitly asked to call on their "general knowledge, 
sensitivity, and em pathy" in understanding "the individual's person­
ality, profession, inclinations and interests" (p. 353), than when they 
were nsked to make their judgment like "a scientist analyzing data."
More central to the key point of the present article, the applicability 
of the cooperative principle of social discourse was m a n ip u la ted  in 
the present study. Some subjects were told that the person d escription  
was written by a human communicator, namely, a p sycholog ist  or a 
nonspecified researcher, replicating the instructions used by Kahneman 
ami T v e rsk y  (1973). This entitles the recipient to assume that the 
presented information obeys the normative ru les  o f  communication 
and reflects a particular communicative intention on the part of  the 
experimenter. Other subjects were told that the identical d escrip tion  
was compiled by a computer that drew a random sample of descriptive 
sentences bearing on the target person. Obviously, the cooperative 
principle does not directly apply to the resulting communication, and 
the communicative intention cannot he unambiguously inferred. 
Whereas the database from which the computer drew the sentences 
was said to have been compiled by psychologists or nonspecified 
researchers, the collection drawn by the computer is of dubious rel­
evance. Moreover, its perceived relevance may depend on the framing 
of the task.
When the task is framed as a psyc/fo/o(^ y problem, subjecls may 
expect a thoughtful expert statement about the individual's personality. 
Facing what is said to be a random sample drawn from a pool of 
expert statements, they may question the usefulness of the selection, 
in particular when the information presented is of little informational 
value. Thus, they may be less likely to "make sense" of this information 
than when it was p re se n te d  as a narrative by a p sycho log ist ,  who 
presumably tried to be informative and relevant. T herefore,  (hey should
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roly less on (he individuating information when it was drawn by a 
computer rnther than presented by a psychologist.
When the task is framed as a statistics problem, however, the 
predictions are less clear. On the one hand, the framing of the problem 
m ay rentier the individuating information irrelevant, independent of 
who compiled il. On the other hand, random sampling is a valued 
statistical procedure that is assumed to result in a representation of 
the p o p u la t io n  from which Ihe sample is drawn. To the extent lhat 
the framing of the task as a statistics problem activates (his concept 
of random sampling, subjects may consider a random sample of sen­
tences a stochastic event lhat results in a d escrip tion  of greater di- 
agnosticity than a thumbnail description provided by a researcher 
whose particular expertise on personality issues is unknown. If so, 
Ihey may rely more on what is purportedly a "representative" sample 
of descriptive information, resulting in a more pronounced impact of 
Ihe individuating information under random sampling conditions.
In summary, these predictions hold that subjects' use of indivi­
duating and base-rate information depends on the inferred commu­
nicative intention of the experimenter. Allhough this prediction is in 
line with previous research that demonstrated that base-rate information 
will be used if it seems highly relevant to the task (for reviews, see 
I liggins f t  IJargh, 1987; Trope &  Ginossar, 1988), the present theorizing 
suggests that its relevance is not only a function of explicit task char­
acteristics. Rather, the perceived relevance of individuating and base- 
rate information is hypothesized to depend on the conversational 
context of the judgment. Thus, Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) original 
findings may not reflect a universal human deficiency but the product 
of a specific social interaction that is guided by effective rules of con­
versation. In this perspective, the "neglect of base-rate information" 
should replicate only under contextual conditions lhat allow corre­
sponding inferences about the experimenter's communicative intention 
about which information should enter into the subjects' judgment 
and lhat grant the nondiagnostic individuating information a high 
degree of relevance.
EXPERIMENT 1
M ETH O D
Forty-four German college students who visited the open house of 
the Psychology Department of ihe Universily of Heidelberg participated 
in the experiment. Their task was to estimate the probability lhat a
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target person, who was randomly drawn from a pool of .10 engineers 
and 7(1 lawyers and described lo them in a short paragraph, was an 
engineer.
In the Humait Coiinnunknlor conditions, a German translation of 
Knhneman and Tversky's (1973) instructions was used with the fol­
lowing alterations: In the /’syr/Hi/uyy F m ining conditions these instruc­
tions were identical lo the ones reproduced above, except that the 
reference to "experls" in the second paragraph was changed to refer 
explicitly lo "psychologists." In Ihe Statistics runn ing  conditions, the 
first paragraph of the above instructions referred nonspecifically lo 
"researchers," whereas the second paragraph specified "statisticians" 
as the experts who can solve the task correctly,
In the G unfiiitcr Coniiiiiin icntioii conditions, subjects were toid lhal 
a computer had randomly drawn several pieces of information from 
the psychologists' (or researchers') file pertaining to the target person.
All subjects were presented the same description, again adapted 
from Kahneman and Tversky (1973) with minor alterations. The de­
scription read:
llniv« K. is 45 yenra old. He is married and has four children. Hans K. 
is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest 
in social and political issues. He spends most of his lime on his many 
hobbies, which include working on his house, sailing, and solving math­
ematical puzzles.
This description was followed by the dependent variable, which read: 
"The probability that Hans K. is one of the 30 engineers in the sample
of 1(K) is----% . "
In the Human Communicator conditions, the person description 
was presented as one typewritten paragraph. In Ihe Computer Com­
munication conditions, the identical text was presented on one sheet 
of computer printout, with each new sentence beginning on a new 
line. In addition, an arbitrary number appeared in parentheses at the 
beginning of each sentence. Following the experiment, nil subjeds 
were completely debriefed and probed for suspicion. None of the 
subjects doubted the truthfulness of the cover story, including the 
computer manipulation.
RESULTS
Table t shows subjects' estimates of the probability that Ihe target 
person was an engineer as n function of the experimental conditions. 
Analysis of variance revealed a significant interaction of framing and
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TAiJi.n i
I Miniated Probability ni Targcl's Doing an Engineer as a Hunclion i>( Conversational 
CtuHcxl
INDIVIDUATING INFORMATION
I KAMINC;
WRITt KN BY 
RKShARCI ILiR
COMPILE!) »Y
COMI’U'I t:K
l'syilutlitgy problem 
Statistics problem
.76
.55
.41)
.74
Noli- N u l l  per cell. 1 hr linsi’-rfllf pruhability ii  .311.
presentation formal, f  (1, 40) = 11.89, /> < .002, and no main effecls,
I s - I .
When the task was framed as a psychology problem and the 
personality descriplion was purportedly written by a psychologist, 
subjects assumed that the target person was an engineer, M  =  .76, 
despite the low a priori probability of .30. More important, the impact 
of the individuating information was greatly attenuated when it was 
said to be drawn at random by a computer, M  = .40, F (1, 40) = 9.97, 
)> < .005, for the simple effect. This finding suggests that subjects 
relied less on the individuating information when it lacked the "guar­
antee of relevance" that characterizes most of human communication. 
When the task was framed as a statistics problem, on the other hand, 
subjects weighted the individuating information more, M  = .74, when 
it was drawn at random from a larger sample of descriptive information 
rather than written by a nonspecified researcher, M  = .55, F (1, 40) ■= 
2,95, /> = .10. This presumably reflects that random sampling is a 
valued procedure in a statistical framework. Accordingly, subjects for 
whom the task was introduced as a statistics problem may have assumed 
that they were supposed to use the "random sample of descriptive 
information" in making their judgment.
In addition, a comparison of both Human Communicator conditions 
indicates Hint subjects relied more on the personality information 
when it was presented by a psychologist, M  = .76, than by a non­
specified researcher, M  = .55, F (1, 40) = 3.53, p <  .08, for the simple 
effect, much as the psychologist's expert status and the framing of 
the task would suggest.
D ISC U SS IO N
In summary, the findings of Experiment 1 indicate that subjects based 
their judgment on information that corresponded to the presumed
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communkalive intention of llic oxporimenler lh.il was inferred I runt 
(ho particular context. Thus, they weighted irrelevant personality in­
formation more when (hoy were (old that psychologists arc* good .it 
solving the task than when they were told that statisticians do well. 
More important, however, the impact of the format in which the 
individuating information was presented depended on the framing 
of the task. When the framing of the task suggested that it was a 
psyi’fdj/dyy problem, subjects relied on personality information more 
when it was presented as a thumbnail description written by an expert 
on personality— whose communication they could believe to he in­
formative, truthful, and relevant— than when it was randomly drawn 
by a computer. In contrast, when the framing of the task suggested 
that it was a slnlislicf ftrublan, subjects tended to rely more on information 
drawn by a computer, presumably because in a statistical framework 
random sampling suggests that the resulting selection is representative 
of the population of descriptive information from which it is drawn. 
In combination, this pattern of findings indicates that subjects relied 
on the information that seemed most relevant in the context of the 
respective frame.
Note that these weighting decisions were perfectly reasonable if 
the information provided to subjects were indeed relevant. W lia l 
renders these weightings dubious is only the violation of basic con­
versational norms on part of the experimenter: The experimenter in­
tentionally constructed a message that was not informative and that 
was irrelevant to the task at hand but presented this message in a 
context that suggested otherwise. The subjects' "error" was to pay 
attention to (lie context in addition to (he information, rather than to 
rely on the implications of the information's content per so, irrespective 
of its context. I lowever, one hesitates to consider this a serious error; 
after all, the expertise and thoughtfulness of a source is an appropriate 
aspect to consider in the evaluation of information. To (his exlent, 
the "error" produced in the laboratory is unlikely lo result in "mistakes" 
in the real world, where communicators are likely lo conform lo con­
versational norms and where recipients are expected lo make use of 
the context of an utterance should the communica(or not live up to 
the ideal.
Finally, it is informative to compare the present study with Zukier 
and IVpitone's (1984) sludy on "social roles in prediction." These 
authors presented Kahnenian and Tversky's (1973) problem either as 
a sludy on "an individual's general sensitivity and intuitive under­
standing of another person" (p. 353) or as a sludy on "how  much 
people will use scientific thinking when making decisions on the basis 
of a few pieces of information" (p. 352). In the former condition,
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subjects were instructed to act like clinicians: " I d understand ( h r  
individual's personality, professional inclinations and interests" and 
lo call on their "general knowledge, sensitivity, and empathy" (p. 
353). In the taller condition, they were asked to assume Ihe role of a 
scientist and were instructed: "Make your judgment as if you were a 
scientist analyzing dnla. Do not simply indicate whether you believe 
lhat Ihe person described is an engineer. Instead, try lo indicate the 
objective probability lhat the description belongs lo one of the 30 
engineers in the sample" (p. 353).
I he re.su I Us obtained under these iustruclions parallel the findings 
under the I luinan Communicator conditions of the present experiment. 
In both studies, subjects relied more on the individuating information 
when the instructions defined the task as a psychology ralher than a 
.statistics problem. Zukier and Pepitone (1984) concluded from this 
finding that a "scientific orientation will enhance the relative influence 
of base-rale information, whereas Ihe clinical orientation will enhance 
the influence of the information about the individual case" (p. 350). 
The findings obtained under the Computer Communication conditions 
of the present study qualify this conclusion, which would predict n 
main effect of task framing rather than an Interaction effect of framing 
and source of the individuating information. Specifically, when the 
individuating information was selected by a computer ralher than by 
a human communicator, subjects made less use of it when the task 
was framed as a psychology problem than when it was framed as a 
statistics problem, for the reasons outlined above. Although a random 
sample of information selected by a cumputer was discounted by 
subjects who may have adopted a "clinical" orientation, it was con­
sidered diagnostic by subjects who may have adopted a "scientific" 
orientation lhat implies that random sampling results in a representative 
selection.
It is conceivable that this differential reliance on individuating 
information under both judgmental orientation conditions of the present 
study was further facilitated by differences in presentation mode. 
Specifically, the individuating information was presented ns a narrative 
under Psychology Framing conditions but as a series of separate sen­
tences, with an arbitrary number appearing in parentheses at the 
beginning of each sentence, under Statistics Framing conditions. As 
Higgins (1981) observed, individuals rely more on a given piece of 
information if it is presented in a mode that is consistent ralher Ilian 
inconsistent wilh their expectations. Jf so, the malch between task 
framing (psychology vs. statistics problem) and presentation mode 
(narrative vs. categorical) may have contributed lo subjects’ differential 
use of individuating information by increasing their reliance on in­
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formation lh.nl was presented in a style consistent with lask framing. 
Prom the Gricean perspective offered here, such n process would 
s u re s t  tlutl the choice of a presentation format may contribute In 
recipients' inferences about the communicator's intentions, allowing 
stronger inferences with regard to the intended meaning if the pre­
sentation style matches the framing of the task.
EXPERIMENT 2
Much as communicators in everyday settings are expeclcd to use the 
context of a conversation to determine the communicator's intention, 
we may expect subjects in a psychological experiment to use the 
experimental context to define the task they are meant to perform. 
In this regard, the effects of framing the task as a p sych o log y  problem 
or as a .statistics problem in Experiment 1, as well as the results of 
the Zukier and Pepitone ( IVtt4) study described above, indicate that 
the task presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) needs to be 
interpreted for appropriate action— that is, llie required judgment. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that the conversational dynamics under­
lying the original instructions elicit an interpretation of the task as a 
personality problem. We will now turn to the impact of another feature 
of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) methodology, namely, the use of 
a within-subjects design.
In their study, subjects received descriptions of five different 
persons who were all said to be drawn from the same sample. Thus, 
the individuating information was varied, but the base rale was held 
constant. If subjects use the experimental context to determine the 
exact nature of their task, this procedure implicitly suggests that the 
judgment should be based on those aspects of the information that 
varies in the course of the experiment. Specifically, this "variation 
principle" indicates to the subjecls that the experimenter is interested 
in how well they can discriminate between persons who are differentially 
likely to be lawyers or engineers. This interpretation may be particularly 
suitable because the task would otherwise result in identical solutions 
for each of the five targets drawn from the same sample, and it may 
be hard to see w hy "experts" (and most notably, psychologists) are 
needed to do well.
A reversal of the procedure illustrates our point. Assume that 
subjects are provided with the description of a single person and 
asked to estimate the probability that this person is an engineer (a) 
if drawn from a sample of 10 engineers and 90 lawyers, or (b) if drawn 
from a sample of 31) engineers and 70 lawyers. It seems likely that
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subjects would construe iheir task as pertaining tu Ihc impact of base 
rales on I ho likelihood of (he (arget person's being an engineer and, 
accordingly, would ulilize ihe base-ralc informalion presenled lo them.
The general point made here is (hat (he use of informalion does 
not depend on its diagnoslicily per se bu( on the subject's perception 
of the experimenter’s communicative intention (i.e., whnl subjects 
believe (hoy are supposed lo do), which is inferred from both the 
literal instructions and the context of the situation. The cooperative 
principle of social discourse requires participants to be sensitive lo 
such cues. To explore the possibility (hat the variation of one type of 
information over time may serve as a cue (o use il for the judgment, 
either the individuating informalion or the base-rate informalion was 
varied as a wilhin-subjects factor in Experiment 2. Il was expecled 
lhal varying the individuating information within subjects would in­
crease the impact of (he individuating information by suggesting to 
subjects that differences between the target persons are of interest. 
On the other hand, varying the base rale information within subjects 
should decrease the impact of the individuating information by sug­
gesting lhal differences between (lie sample arc of inlercsl.
I his hypothesis was tested in a 3 x 2 factorial design, in which 
subjects received cither a description of one person or descriptions 
of two persons drawn from a sample of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers 
and estimated the probability of (he target person's being an engineer. 
A third group of subjects received only one person description but 
estimated the probability of the target's being an engineer if drawn 
from two samples with different base rates. In addition, the task was 
presented in either a psychology framework or a statistics framework 
lo provide a partial replication of Experiment 1.
M ETH O D
Forty-eight psychology undergraduates at the University of Illinois 
participated as part of a class requirement and were randomly assigned 
(o conditions. Subjects in the Psychology Framing conditions received 
Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) original instructions, whereas subjects 
assigned to the Statistics Framing conditions received the modified 
instructions described in Experiment 1. All subjects estimated the 
probability that a target person drawn from a sample of 30 engineers 
and 70 lawyers was an engineer. The description was laken from 
Kahneman and Tversky and read:
jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is
generally conservalivc, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in
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political nnd social issues and spends most of his free lime <tn his many 
hubbies which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical pti77les.
Subjects in (lie Our I'ar^el conditions received only this description. 
For subjects in Ihe Tun Tnrycls conditions, this description was preceded 
by a nondiagnostic description of another largot person (Dick), also 
taken from Kahneman and Tversky. Finally, subjects in the 'I'tiu  linsc 
fa irs  conditions firsl estimated the probability of Jack's being an engineer 
if drawn from a sample of 10 engineers and 90 lawyers and subsequently 
estimated the probability of Jack's being an engineer if drawn from 
a sample of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers.
RESULTS
Subjects' probability judgments are shown in Table 2 as a function 
of the experimental variables. As in the Human Communicator con­
ditions of Experiment 1, subjects relied more on the individuating 
information and less on the base-rate information if psychologists 
were described as the source of Ihe information and as Ihe experts 
who do well, M  = .69, than if nonspecified researchers were given 
as Ihe source and statisticians as the experts, M -  ,56, T (1, 42) = 
3,47, j i  < .07 , for the main effect.
In addition, the impact of individuating and base-rate information 
depended on which information was varied within subjects, /’ (2, 42) = 
3,36, /> <.05, for the main effect. Specifically, subjects relied more on 
the individuating information if two target persons were presented, 
M  = .73, than if only one target person was presented, M  ~ .62, 
Their reliance on individuating information decreased, on the other 
hand, if two different base rates were presented for the same target 
person, M  = .51, although this estimate still reflects an underutilization 
of base-rate information.
Estimated Probability of Target's Being an Engineer as a Funrlinn nl Praming and 
Wlthin-Subjects Variation
TABLE 2
PRAMINO
WITHIN-SUBIECTS VARIATION
2 PERSONS. ¡PERSON, I THRSON,
1 SAMPLE 1 SAMPLE 2 SAMPt.tiS
Psychology
Statistics
,R2
.65
.7.1
.69
.56
.62
.55
.<18
.51
.69
.56
NmU\ N is B per cell, live Hi sc r.11c probability I' .30
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As predicted Lty (lit1 cooperative principle of social discourse, subjects 
used the context of the experimental procedures to determine the 
exact nature of Iheir task (i.e., on which information they were mennl 
to base their judgment). As in Experiment 1, they relied more on the 
individuating information if it was presented by a psychologist rather 
than a nonspecified researcher and when psychologists rather than 
statisticians were said to be the experts who do well. In addition, 
subjects were more likely lo use the information that was varied in 
the materials presented to them, presumably because the variation 
principle served as a contextual cue that helped them define the exact 
task they were supposed to perform. Receiving descriptions of two 
persons drawn from the same sample emphasized differences in the 
features of these persons as an appropriate data base, whereas receiving 
one description with base-rate information pertaining to two different 
samples may have suggested that differences between the samples 
were of interest.
These results are consistent with other findings that subjects are 
more likely to use base-rate information if it is varied within subjects 
ralher than between subjects (Fischhoff, Slovic, &  Lichtenstein, 1979). 
Like us, Fischhoff et al. attribute this behavior to experimental demand 
effects. They write: "Asking subjects lo make the same judgment 
several limes while varying the value imputed to one variable contains 
an implicit demand that they change their responses somehow. Refusal 
to change makes a strong statement regarding the irrelevance of the 
varied piece of information" (p. 340). However, Fischhoff et al. did 
not attribute the source of this demand to the operation of conversational 
principles but to a form of "subjective sensitivity analysis." This logic 
seems lo require lhal the subject be exposed lo multiple values on 
the same variable. I lowever, as we have shown, it is possible to obtain 
a similar pattern of results by using a simpler procedure lhal implies 
only one single contrast. This suggests that the present analysis provides 
a more parsimonious account of the processes that underlie the dif­
ferential impact of the same information when presented in a between- 
subjects rather than a within-subjects design.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In combination, the present findings imply that the study of human 
judgmental biases may have yielded an overly pessimistic portrayal 
of decision makers. The results of the present studies suggest that 
some demonstrations of presumably pervasive "judgmental biases''
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may not reflect universal shortcomings of the human species hut may 
result from the application of discourse rules in a specific situational 
context. Unfortunately, Iho communicative context of human judgment 
has been neglected by many researchers in the area, who treat the 
subject as an isolated information processor who is supposed to rely 
solely on the literal meaning of the information provided by the ex­
perimenter. The subject, however, is likely to perceive the experiment 
as an instance of social discourse. Accordingly, subjects apply the 
rules that govern social discourse in everyday life to the experimental 
selling. Thus, they expect the experimenter to provide only information 
that is informative, truthful, and relevant, and they use the context 
of the conversation to determine the experimenter's communicative 
intention, much as they are supposed to do in everyday life (see 
I liggins, 1981, for a related discussion).
In line with these assumptions, subjects in the present studies 
were found to consider the context of the experiment in addition to 
the literal meaning of the information provided to them. Accordingly, 
they were more likely to rely on individuating information of low 
diagnosticity nt the expense of bnse-rale information when the indi­
viduating information was provided by a psychologist rather than a 
nonspecified researcher (Experiments 1 and 2). In addition, Iheir use 
of individuating information depended on the framing of the task 
and the alleged source. When the task was framed as a psychology 
problem, subjects relied more on personality information when it was 
selected by a human communicator (whom they could assume to 
comply to conversational norms) than when it was selected by a 
computer. In contrast, they relied more on a random sample of de­
scriptive information drawn by a computer when the framing of the 
task as a statistics problem matched that presentation style, presumably 
implying representativeness of the randomly sampled information 
(Experiment 1). Moreover, subjects used variations in the information 
provided to them to determine the focus of the task and relied more 
on individuating information when the task seemed to pertain to 
differences between persons; but they relied more on base-rale in­
formation when the task seemed to pertain to differences between 
samples (Experiment 2), although the latter manipulation was not 
sufficient to eliminate fully the underutilization of base-rate information.
In summary, then, subjects in our studies, as well as in related 
studies (see I liggins &  Uargh, 1987; Trope &  Ginossar, 1988, for reviews), 
used the information that seemed relevant to the judgment at hand 
at the expense of other information. Although previous research dem­
onstrated that the use of base-rate information varies as a function of 
explicit task characteristics, the present studies indicate that subjects'
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inferences about (he nature of (heir task and the relevance of the 
presented information depend on the specifics of the communicative 
context. Where their judgments deviated most clearly from normative 
models, they did so because subjects went beyond the literal meaning 
of the information given and used the communicative context to de­
termine the nature of the task and the relevance of the various sources 
of information. The errors that they committed by doing so are unlikely 
lo result in mistakes in everyday contexts, in which communicators 
try conform to conversational norms, provide information that is rel­
evant lo I lu* judgment at hand, and make Ihe task one that is clear 
rallier than ambiguous— and in which recipients are indeed expected 
lo use contextual cues to disambiguate (he communication should Ihe 
communicator not live up to the standard. Thus, (he behavior that 
may lead lo errors in the experimenlal context may be adaptive in 
everyday settings. As Funder (1987) recently noted in a related context, 
" II seems ironic that go ing  b e y o n d  the information given in this way 
is so often interpreted by social psychologists as symptomatic of flawed 
judgment. Current thinking in the field of artificial intelligence is that 
this propensity is exactly what makes people smarter than computers" 
(p. 82).
To acknowledge this special potential of human information pro­
cessors, social cognilion research will need to pay closer attention to 
Ihe social context of inference processes. As Markus & Zajonc pointed 
out (1985), social cognition research will need to extend the "flowchart 
model of information processing that presents us only with a unilateral 
input/output paradigm that stops short of reciprocity" (p. 212). In­
corporating aspects of conversational pragmatics into "pragmatic" ap­
proaches to inference processes (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, ¿rThagard, 
1986; Srull &  Wyer, 1986), which emphasize the goal-directedness of 
cognitive processes but have so far not paid attention to the role of 
communicative contexts in determining the goals, may provide a good 
starting point for this endeavor.
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